THE New Republic

The Economy—
From Slip to
Slide to Slump

Pages 3-4

A Blueprint for Military Disengagement in Europe

by DENIS HEALEY

Happy, Hopeful Democrats . . *Louis H. Bean*
The American Small Town . . *Richard Hoggart*
Kingsley Amis' New Novel . . . *William Esty*
Twenty-Three Went Fishing . . *W. F. Neuman*
18th Century British Art . . . . . *Frank Getlein*

MARCH 24, 1958

25 cents

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Washington Wire

Mistakes Will Happen

WALTER GREGG, 37, railway worker, was in the garage of his asbestos-shingled gray house at Florence, S. C., his son Walter, 6, just outside, his family around, when an atomic bomb accidentally dropped from a B-47 jet bomber crashed beside him. The bomb's TNT trigger device exploded making a hole 50-feet wide, 35-feet deep, injuring house, garage, and all the family, but the atomic charge did not go off. "The chances of an atomic explosion were one in a million," the Defense Department said. "I feel lucky," Gregg said.

A small atomic bomb experimentally exploded underground last September emulsified 400,000 tons of rock, made the mountain jump six inches but could not be heard on a seismograph beyond "250 miles" the AEC reported, inferentially destroying hope of international detection. Disarmament is dead, said Dr. Teller. But re-examination suddenly reveals that the shock was felt in Alaska with the AEC once more guilty either of bad science or bad information.

The Gregg incident dominated British newspapers and debates. Moscow jumped in to say such a slip might start a war. But US newspapers gave both incidents only listless attention. Mistakes will happen, they explained.

Can we set down possible reasons for the amazing difference in present attitude on this subject between the US and the rest of the world—Britain particularly? Such an emotional chasm has not existed for years. Britain, of course, was bombed —the US wasn't. That is one reason. Others—a Marxist, pacifist tradition lingers in British trade unions with no such tradition in US unions; British intellectuals find voice in parliament, American intellectuals find little in Congress—politics are involved—in the UK the left-wing Labour group makes capital out of denouncing US air bases, while in the US the GOP leaders still have a vested interest in pooh-poohing Adlai Stevenson's warnings at the last election.

But there are deeper reasons for America's amazing apathy.

We know, of course, that one H-bomb, 1000 times as powerful as the Hiroshima bomb, could destroy metropolitan New York (estimated 5 million dead and wounded); that 70 million would die in the "first wave" of all-out nuclear war. Americans know this, at least they have been told.

We would speculate that besides the specific reasons above there are more compelling hidden ones. America is saturated with warnings, bored with them, shrugging at the excesses of earlier bomb shelter tests and preposterous road signs reading, "In case of enemy attack this highway will be closed." Then again, we guess that McCarthyism left a legacy that persists and is not appreciated—for example, that it still tends to correlate disarmament talk with "appeasement," making militancy on the subject unfashionable, intellectualism suspect. And finally, of course, there is the sedative influence of Eisenhower, soothing us on Sputniks, on education, on the recession—on every ill; stupefying the public and creating the impotency of a queen-less hive.

The result is a national mood of indifferent helplessness. Nuclear war? what can we do about it! Better relax, and let our inner frustration find vent in a kind of diabolic humor as we shrug at 70 million dead. "What if the Gregg bomb *had* gone off?" somebody asks. "Why," comes the chuckling answer, "it would have solved the unemployment surplus!" Not a bad last line for the human race. Exit laughing.

The Kohler Case

THE STRIKE in the Wisconsin Kohler plant for fabricating plumbing fixtures has gone on for four years, with 24 years of bad blood before that. The company's 400 private guards crushed a strike in 1934 and at one point shot into a crowd of strikers and their families, killing two and wounding 47, many in the back. In 1953 the UAW ousted a paternalistic company union, but boss Herbert Kohler (a modern Sewell Avery) installed a new arsenal, forced another strike after one year, marked by violence and hate. An NLRB examiner, after two years of hearings, has found the company guilty of unfair labor practices, and of bargaining "not to reach, but to avoid, agreement." The union has certainly been guilty of lawlessness; it is surprising how little under the circumstances.

The strange thing is that the Senate Republicans of the McClellan Anti-Rackets Committee — Mundt (SD), Curtis (Neb.) and Goldwater (Ariz.), (with the voting support of Ives, NY,) —have been willing in protracted hearings to espouse the Kohler management over the Democrats' protest. They have produced no new facts. As one reporter observed, "Curtis and Mundt aren't bright; in the Senate when they start to speak we lay down our ball-points—here we can't." Another rhymed—"Mundt's / A dundts." The UAW told the committee that if it would arbitrate it would obey unqualifiedly; the company hastily declined. The current hearings have damaged everybody's reputation—the UAW, Kohler, and the McClellan Committee most of all.

Notes

THE HARRIS Legislative Oversight Subcommittee was almost maudlin in kissing off FCC Commissioner Mack, even thanking him on the last day for being a "good witness," though he couldn't remember the source of a mysterious $8000 in his bank account; the committee majority hates its job of investigating traditional lobbying. . . . Now it's the turn of Col. Gordon Moore, the President's brother-in-law. . . . One paradox economists don't explain: with an insatiable demand for goods why should they call this an "over-expansion" recession? Unsatisfied wants lie side by side with idle factories—Why? . . . Public protest will defeat the Congressional proposal to stick an architectural "falsie" on the front of the US Capitol. . . . Washington now expects this year's Eisenhower deficit to be between $5 and $15 billion.

T.R.B.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The New Republic
A JOURNAL OF OPINION

1244 NINETEENTH ST., N.W.
WASHINGTON 6, D. C.

VOL. 138, NO. 12, ISSUE 2262
MARCH 24, 1958

THE WEEK 3

The Slump; Bargaining from Weakness; Detecting Nuclear Tests; Le McCarthyism; Last Hope in Riyadh; Closed Circuit on RCA

ARTICLES 8

Happy, Hopeful Democrats by Louis Bean

A Discussion of "Russia and the West" Adlai Stevenson, Pierre Mendès-France, Hugh Gaitskell

A Blueprint for Military Disengagement by Denis Healey

BOOKS 17

ART 22

GILBERT A. HARRISON, *Editor & Publisher*
MICHAEL STRAIGHT, *Editor-at-Large*
HELEN FULLER, *Managing Editor*
SELIG S. HARRISON, *Associate Editor*
ROBERT EVETT, *Book & Music Editor*
F. R. Ruskin, *Asst. to the Publisher*
Contributing Editors: Alexander M. Bickel, Frank Getlein, B. H. Haggin, Irving Howe, Gerald W. Johnson, James E. King, Jr., Donald Malcolm, Helen Hill Miller

Published weekly (except for omissions of four summer issues) and distributed to newsstands by the Eastern News Company, N. Y. 14, N. Y. Phone: REpublic 7-8656. Entered as second-class matter September 26, 1950, at the post office at Washington, D. C., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Single copy, 25¢; Yearly subscription, $8.00; Foreign, $9.00. Armed Forces personnel or students, $5.00. Subscribers desiring change of address should notify us at least three weeks in advance. Please include both old and new addresses. Copyright, 1958, by Harrison-Blaine, Inc.

Correspondence

► *Liberals & Modern Art*

SIRS:

TO BE a true liberal you should have a sympathetic understanding of abstract expressionism; but no one insists that you like it. The richness of art experience is available to us according to the level of our understanding. People agree that to know anything in math, they

(Continued on page 23)

The Slump

SEVEN HUNDRED thousand more men and women joined the jobless last month. This brings the official total of those looking for work and unable to find it to 5.2 million—6.7 percent of the working force. The true figure is probably 6 million if you count in those who are working part-time, involuntarily. A million one-hundred fifty-thousand have now been unemployed for 15 weeks or longer. (Three-hundred thousand more reached that unhappy stage last month.) And increasing numbers have drawn the last unemployment insurance check to which the law entitles them. Those who process new claims for unemployment compensation as they are filed predict that when all the March reports are filed, the news will be worse.

Clearly this is no "rolling readjustment" that will right itself. No more statistics are needed to prove that quick and massive action is necessary and this means action in Washington.

But we shall not act wisely unless we first understand just what has happened.

Some of last month's layoffs (from outdoor jobs) were caused by bad weather, but most of them came from continuing cutbacks in the metals and machinery industries and in automobile plants. The recession is concentrated—for the present—in the durable goods sector of the economy, both in consumer durables like cars and appliances and in producer durables like plants, equipment and automation devices.

Up until last month consumer buying had dropped scarcely at all since the recession began. And for the country as a whole there is still no serious decline in soft goods; employment is steady in service and retail jobs. The damage has occurred in manufacturing and construction.

The first requirement, therefore, is to apply first aid to the damaged areas so as to stop the pain and prevent trouble from spreading.

First aid should include:

► *Extension of unemployment insurance for workers whose benefits have run out.* The Administration favors providing federal funds to pay for 16 weeks of benefits beyond the maximum time allowed by the states. Several bills sponsored by Democrats, including one introduced by Sen. John Kennedy (Mass.) and Rep. Eugene McCarthy (Minn.), would require that to qualify for the additional federal money the states must raise the present ratio of benefits to average earnings—a practical way to force a needed reform.

► *Cancellation or reduction of excise taxes on cars and transportation,* IF manufacturers and operators in turn will agree to pass the savings on to the public. Removal of the wartime taxes on train and plane tickets might stimulate travel. And reducing prices should move more new model cars —at least to owners who have met enough installments to have equity for a reasonable turn-in on their present models.

► *Speed up government contract placing, civil and military.* Business

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

might then start work on some of their plans for building new plants and modernizing old ones which were shelved last fall, with such depressing effect on the economy. New government orders should encourage corporate boards to dust off blueprints, start ordering materials and spending money. Industry can afford to finance this new investment out of retained earnings, without taxcuts—if it believes new capital goods projects will earn their way. A stream of contracts from the Pentagon and the Department of Interior can help perk up such business confidence. Both departments have large sums on hand for already authorized projects which they could process rapidly. To keep this investment stream flowing much beyond the November elections, however, will take new federal appropriations.

► *Easing of housing credit.* Making more funds available, at attractive interest rates, through the Federal Housing Agency and the Veterans' Administration for private home buyers and for public housing as a part of urban renewal, would have a double value: It would stimulate the hard-hit construction industry and with it production of steel, concrete and the other durables that building consumes. And as an after effect, it could be counted on to provide new markets for consumer durables: the man with a new house is a potential customer for a new stove, refrigerator or washing machine.

► *Tax cuts.* This is the quickest way to create the most additional purchasing power. Bipartisan fear of a political backfire from a substantial tax cut—if the economy should turn upward before the cut took effect and the result was a new spurt of inflation—has led to a "gentleman's agreement" to confer before cutting. But although there are still holdouts within the Administration and among the Democrats against tax cutting, the practical men of both sides have decided for it. They aren't yet agreed, however, on where or when to cut.

For a cut to do the most immediate good and the least long-run harm the existing tax structure should be kept intact so that present rates can go back into effect automatically once the economy is rolling again. (The government will need *at least* the current level of taxes to pay for defense and public works we will need for years to come.) And the cuts should follow a formula which returns a lump sum to the taxpayer large enough to tempt him to buy things he had not planned to buy—preferably durable goods.

Last year the Democrats agitated for a raise in individual income tax exemptions from $600 to $700 and there is much support for this approach now. In a year's time it would add some $2.76 billion to the purchasing power of the under $5,000-per-year income group which can be depended on to spend most of the saving fast. But a plan more certain to produce a big economic boost fast, it seems to us, is an across-the-board temporary cut in the withholding tax, either a flat percentage cut for the last six months of this year or total, or partial, "forgiveness" of the usual withholding tax for 60-90 days. A reduction in the rate from 18 to 9 percent in the tax for the second half of 1958 would, for example, put $1 billion into the stream of spendable consumer income over that period of time. "Forgiveness" of withholding taxes for 90 days, based on 1957 receipts, would release $6.5 billion in half the time—$4.3 billion if for 60 days.

The response to the 1958 recession confirms what many have assumed for some time: we now have bipartisan agreement in this country to the proposition that the federal government cannot turn over responsibility for getting the country out of recessions to private enterprise. Perhaps in the next decade we shall see bipartisan acceptance of the full implications of the Employment Act which has been on the books since 1946, making it the "continuing responsibility of the federal government . . . to utilize all its plans, functions and resources . . . to promote maximum employment, production and purchasing power."

Bargaining from Weakness

"WHEN suggestions are made to us," said George Kennan in his fifth Reith Lecture, "that if aid of one sort or another was not forthcoming, people will, as the saying goes, 'go Communist', surely there is only one answer: 'Very well then, go. Our interests may suffer, but yours will suffer first'." Mr. Kennan did not say what country or countries he had in mind; he was referring, of course, not to this or that public threat but to what might pass behind closed doors. Since Mr. Kennan's lecture, however, Pakistan has given us a gaudy example of attempted blackmail in public, after blackmail in private had failed. At the SEATO meetings in Manila last week the Pakistani delegate coupled demands for more US economic assistance with threats to accept Soviet aid. And in Karachi Prime Minister Firoz Khan Noon warned:

> I hear rumblings that in 1959 the US probably wants to stop our military aid. . . . If our people find their freedom threatened by India, we will break all pacts to save freedom and will shake hands with those whom we have made our enemies for the sake of others.

Prime Minister Noon's threat is remarkable not only because it was made in public but because it places on the record so explicitly Pakistan's view of its collective security commitment as a sacrifice "for the sake of others." Prime Minister Noon has told us what we have yet to hear from Secretary Dulles: that Pakistan signed up for US arms in 1954 not to deter Soviet aggression but to strengthen its hand in the Kashmir dispute with India; he has destroyed, once and for all we hope, the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pretense which has surrounded US aid to Pakistan. But if he has cleared the air in Washington, he has befogged it in Karachi. For Mr. Noon is now stuck with his threat. He has placed before his people an option to Pakistan's present foreign policy which he will not be permitted to forget.

When Secretary Dulles armed Pakistan—over Indian and Afghan protests—he accomplished two things: he seriously damaged our relations with Asia's most stable country, and he committed us to propping up one of Asia's most unstable countries. Pakistan's instability has since increased: President Iskander Mirza has dethroned Karachi's one politician of stature, former Prime Minister H. S. Suhrawardy, and Pakistan's economic plight is so serious that last week development plans had to be cut in half in the new budget to combat inflation. Now Pakistan is demanding not only indefinite military aid but $200 million per year to shore up its economy—double the $96 million extended in economic aid and defense support in the fiscal year ending last July. The US has no choice, we believe, but to place special emphasis on Pakistan, together with India, in credits allocated by the Development Loan Fund and the Export-Import Bank; instability in one country can spread to the entire subcontinent. However, funds for more economic aid should be shifted from the military hardware and defense support which Karachi now brandishes in its cold war with India over Kashmir. This is the last thing Pakistan wants. But our policy should serve the US interest, and our national interest in South Asia lies in a detente between India and Pakistan. The arms pact only serves to encourage Pakistan in its insistence on a showdown while giving India a pretext for refusing even to discuss Kashmir.

Detecting Nuclear Tests

A THAWING out of the US freeze on nuclear bomb testing is in process in the State Department. Freed of the embarrassing presence of Mr. Stassen, Mr. Dulles and his staff seem to be preparing to take one of Stassen's central ideas for their own: approaching the question of arms control one step at a time—beginning with a temporary and verifiable ban on nuclear tests, separated from all other disarmament issues. Never able to win permission to make such an offer to the Russians, Stassen still believes that the Soviet Union would agree to such a trial and that it could be an important start toward arms control.

However, those who have decided to try Stassen's way are not without opposition. Neither AEC Chairman Lewis Strauss nor his chief scientific adviser, Dr. Edward Teller, show any signs of changing their view that continued tests are essential to security, and that to cease testing would be an open invitation to engage in "boot-



"You know, Lewis, I think I do detect some blasts"

leg" tests which would be technically impossible to detect. And their power with the President should not be underestimated. Strauss and Teller, together with Dr. Ernest Lawrence, it will be remembered, personally persuaded Mr. Eisenhower to reverse his National Security Council the last time ending nuclear tests was an issue in 1956.

But a few things have changed since then. "The Father of the H-Bomb," as Dr. Teller is so often described, has had his halo slightly tilted by attacks made on his scientific objectivity. In recent weeks such respected colleagues as Dr. Harrison Brown and Dr. Jay Orear have frontally attacked Dr. Teller's position that there are "very effective possibilities of hiding nuclear tests." Charging Teller with "intentional distortion" of the facts, Brown contends that it is feasible to establish a detection system "which would make the bootlegging of tests extremely difficult if not impossible." He is not alone in the scientific world in this view. Nor in the feeling that Teller's arguments in recent magazine articles and television appearances have been "designed to convince but not necessarily clarify," and that Teller's Hungarian origins have caused him to make scientific statements to support political judgments.

Public confidence in the candor and accuracy of the Teller-Strauss statement of the case against a nuclear test ban has also been somewhat shaken by Sen. Hubert

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Humphrey's investigation of the Nevada underground explosion last September. The AEC's first announcement after the underground test that the blast had not been detected further away than 250 miles was used as evidence that it would be impossible to establish enough inspection centers to monitor tests in the Soviet Union. When Senator Humphrey disclosed that the blast in fact had been detected more than 2,000 miles away in Alaska and at US Geodetic Survey stations all across the continent, the AEC admitted the error—bringing the claim that it would be easy to bootleg tests by going underground back into sharp question.

Dr. Teller still insists that "there are a multiplicity of methods by which detection of atomic explosions can be concealed." And it is fortunate, therefore, that a new scientific court of appeal has come into being since the last time he successfully carried his case to the President. The President's new aide on science and technology, Dr. James R. Killian, has brought together groups of qualified scientists to advise Mr. Eisenhower on just such questions. It is understood that they are currently studying this difference of scientific judgment on the detectability of tests. When Dr. Killian and his committee give the President their report, we hope they will find it possible to do what Strauss has never done—take the public into their confidence.

Le McCarthyism

NOTHING more clearly illustrates the feebleness of present French government than the fact that it has now resorted to muzzling the press in order to maintain its shaky hold on power. Thirty-six hours before the Assembly debate and vote of confidence of March 7, the French Ministry of the Interior ordered the seizure of three Paris weeklies—the liberal *Express,* the left-wing *France-Observateur,* and the Communist *France Nouvelle* —which have been critical of the government's policies in North Africa. The ostensible reason for these seizures —in the case of the first two—was the publication of an article by Jean-Paul Sartre about the miscarriage of justice in certain French courts of law and of an article by the recently ex-communicated Socialist, André Philip, about the impossibility of a military victory in Algeria. Seizing publications that dare criticize has been a standard practice of Robert Lacoste's Ministry in Algeria: But until recently no French government has dared apply the same measures on the same scale to the press of metropolitan France.

Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of this official intolerance is the relatively weak echo of protest it has elicited in the great body of the Paris press. Left-wing papers, as could be expected, protested against this latest sanction, but right-wing papers have not hesitated to praise it. Indeed, the conservative *Figaro* thought the incident so trivial that it buried the story on page 8 of its newspaper.

Whether these actions by the Gaillard ministry will suffice to keep it in office remains to be seen. The last time the *Express* was seized in Paris, as its editor, Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber immediately pointed out, was on May 28, 1954—three weeks after the disaster of Dien Bien Phu. Two weeks later the Laniel government collapsed.

Last Hope in Riyadh

THE DECISIVE force in the political turmoil which threatens to dethrone the present pro-US regime in Saudi Arabia is the so-called Saudi Reform Movement, centered among young literate Saudis in the Army, the bureaucracy and the urban middle class—including employees of the Arabian-American Oil Co. Only a candid US effort to persuade King Saud to meet the Reform Movement halfway can conceivably check the Nasser-led campaign to cut Saudi Arabia's Western ties—if indeed it is still possible for Riyadh to remain outside Cairo's sphere of influence.

Unfortunately, the US has never attempted to show its disapproval of the corruption of King Saud's government and court. Our ambassadors have fawned before the King as slavishly as his most abject courtiers. Many Arabs throughout the Middle East believe it is official US policy to encourage the King to squander his oil dollars in lush living so that Saudi Arabian oil can be exploited in peace. Perhaps it is too late to hope for either a willingness to reform on Saud's part or a willingness to press for reform on the part of the State Department. But in any case it is US pressure alone that can conceivably shock Saud into initiating basic reforms: removal of corrupt ministers, creation of responsible ministries manned on the basis of merit and performance, and abolition of the lavish grants to his brothers.

Pressure from the US might, of course, lead Saud to turn in royal pique to Nasser. But the US has little assurance that he will not try to strike a bargain to join the United Arab Republic on Nasser's terms simply to save his regime. Moreover, if Saud refuses concessions both to Nasser and to his domestic critics he may very well be forced out of power—by a limited revolt nominally led by his pro-Nasser brother, Crown Prince Faisal, or by a general revolution establishing a pro-Nasser "republic." One way or another, in the absence of reform—the Strategic Air Command's Dhahran airbase and ARAMCO's $300 million annual royalties seem sure to be added to the Syrian pipelines as major tangible assets of Nasser's power.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Closed Circuit on RCA—I

UNDER the criminal indictment brought by a grand jury in New York on February 21 against the Radio Corporation of America, finally and after 30 years an antitrust proceeding has become a fact. RCA's New York address, 30 Rockefeller Plaza, symbolizes the corporation's affiliation with many forms of bigness from the time of its incorporation as a subsidiary of General Electric in 1919. Then, radio was an infant industry; today, there are more than 145 million sets in use in this country alone. Then, TV was a full generation in the future; the number of sets in use in the United States has grown from 8,000 in 1946 to some 44 million. Then, the scramble for frequencies and the formation of nationwide networks was only a gleam in the eye; today, RCA's National Broadcasting Company, organized in 1926, has 208 TV and 196 radio stations affiliated in coast-to-coast coverage.

The eye with the gleam was David Sarnoff's. A Russian-born immigrant brought to New York as a child of nine, he got his start as office boy in the Marconi Wireless Company in 1906. By 1919, when Marconi was absorbed by the newly-formed RCA, Sarnoff was commercial manager; retaining this post in the new organization, he continued his rise to RCA's presidency in 1930; since 1947, he has been chairman of the board of RCA and of NBC.

RCA was originally established to develop the production and licensing of radio purpose products; equipped at the start with the know-how of the Marconi company, within a few years it had entered into arrangements with Westinghouse and AT & T covering the radio products developed under their auspices. It had also strengthened its domestic position by agreements with similarly dominant foreign firms—English Electric in Great Britain, Telefunk in Germany, Phillipse in Holland. These agreements provided mutually satisfactory licensing arrangements and designated territories for non-competitive marketing by the participating corporations. From this start, RCA has gone on from size to size; its 1957 report to shareholders gives its net profit before federal income taxes as $77,049,000.

Combined with the development of this economic empire has been development of personal contact reaching deep into the heart of Washington. Along the years, complaints of squeeze plays by RCA have been heard on the one hand from private companies and on the other from the Justice Department's antitrust division. Yet up to now, RCA has rarely been in serious trouble.

The bare bones of RCA's antitrust history are these:

► In the 1920's, in a private suit—*Lord v. RCA*—the receiver of the de Forest properties substantiated a claim that RCA was guilty of monopolistic practices respecting radio tubes, requiring tie-ins of licensees making radios.

► After the federal district court's decision in this case had been upheld on appeal, the Federal Radio Commission, precursor of today's FCC, moved under the section of the Federal Radio Act stipulating that convicted monopolists of communications devices should be deprived of their broadcasting frequencies if, as in the case of RCA's NBC, they had any. But RCA retained its frequencies; by a 3-to-2 decision, the Commission decided that tubes were not meant to be included in the communications devices referred to in the law.

► The next major move came in 1930, when the antitrust division of the Department of Justice, under Attorney General William D. Mitchell, brought a civil suit against RCA, charging it, GE, and Westinghouse with an electronics monopoly. The suit was settled out of court in 1932, through a consent decree under which GE and Westinghouse agreed to relinquish their stock and board memberships in RCA, and RCA to desist from exclusive restrictions related to licensing and sales territories in both its domestic and its foreign agreements.

► In 1941, when Francis Biddle was Attorney General and Thurman Arnold head of the antitrust division, another civil suit charged RCA and NBC with an attempt to monopolize radio broadcasting. But two years later, after the FCC had been sustained in its chain-broadcasting ruling that no network should have more than one station in the same city and NBC had made certain adjustments, this suit was dismissed on motion of the government.

► In 1942, the Justice Department attempted to vacate the 1932 consent decree as inadequate, but failed to get court approval.

► In 1952, Attorney General J. Howard McGrath ordered the empanelling of a grand jury on the basis of material developed by H. Graham Morrison, head of the antitrust division, but McGrath's successor, James P. McGranery called a halt to the proceeding.

► Under the new Administration in 1954, with Judge Barnes as head of the antitrust division, the matter was reopened, a civil suit respecting RCA's domestic operations was filed, and a grand jury again authorized to head further evidence.

► In 1957, a private suit, brought against RCA under the triple-damage clause of the antitrust act, was won by the Zenith corporation after seven years of litigation, with $10 million awarded in damages.

► And now in 1958, under Attorney General William P. Rogers, a federal indictment charges the RCA with intent to practice restraint of trade both through licensing agreements with domestic manufacturers of communications equipment, and through agreements covering both licenses and sales territories with major producers abroad, the effect of which has been to stifle exports and imports and set up non-competitive markets.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Happy, Hopeful Democrats

by LOUIS BEAN

EVERYBODY, it seems, is now forecasting a general Democratic victory in the Congressional election in November, and all there is left to argue about is whether the Democrats will pick up only 25 seats or, as TRB's bones tell him, as many as 100. If the Democratic gains approximate the upper end of this range, you can be sure the Congress will be a more vigorous one, for its new Democratic blood will come almost entirely from Northern industrial and Midwestern districts.

There are two curves to watch—one official, the other unofficial—if you want to join the many who will make reputations this year as accurate election forecasters. Gallup will advise you currently on the President's popularity, from which you will be able to judge whether the President's influence on Congressional elections will be greater or less next November than in the elections of 1956 and 1954. The Federal Reserve Board and the US Department of Labor will advise you more frequently on the course of industrial activity and unemployment. Appraise these two trends correctly and your reputation is made, for all you need to do then is to apply two of my formulas.

Formula #1 says that in normal times the party in power tends to lose 25 to 30 seats in the mid-term Congressional elections following a Presidential election. The President of the US Chamber of Commerce has just predicted that by June "we will have a full recovery" from the present recession and things will be back to normal by election day. If you wish to accept this startlingly unique optimism when most of those about you are saying something else, apply this tested formula. In 1950 when the Truman recession of 1948-49 was over, I tested it by predicting that the Democrats were likely to lose 25 to 30 seats. They actually lost 27. But in my opinion your chances of hitting the bull's eye this year as closely as that are not bright if you accept this premature optimism of the US Chamber of Commerce.

Before turning to the second formula—which applies to Congressional election results in mid-term years characterized by recession or depression—let us look at the extent of this recession so far and where it is likely to be next October. As of the beginning of March it is still possible to say industrial production has fallen about 10 percent since last summer when the Federal Reserve Board index was registering 146. Consequently, a decline noticeably below 131 (January, 133) would mean that the second Eisenhower recession is turning out to be deeper than his first one in 1953-54 and deeper than the Truman recession of 1948-49.

Practically all the guessing that this recession will bottom out during the summer months is based on little more than two central facts about our business cycles. First, with the exception of the prolonged depression after 1929, the major depressions of 1920-21 and 1937-38 and all the minor recessions bottomed out in about a year. The second fact is that practically all of them touched bottom during the summer months. Thus the President, after being advised by economists who know these elementary facts, has at least some statistical basis for promising that the current recession will be turning around by the second, possibly the third quarter.

We are entitled to wonder whether any knowledge more substantial than historical analogy lies behind the President's assurance. Last summer action was taken by our monetary authorities purposefully to check spending by consumers, business and government. Shortly thereafter the President added his advice that consumers ought to hold back on spending to check the industrial boom and then told the financial world, in effect, that the tight credit policy would not be relaxed until a recession was on the way. As the stock market fell, as business activity and business plans began to shrink, as apprehension as to the depth and duration of this governmentally induced recession took shape, our monetary authorities offered only negative assurances and comfort—namely, that there is no certainty as to how far a recession might go when indirect monetary controls are used to check the course of business and speculation. We were offered the comforting thought that ours is a profit and loss economy and we have just been having our prosperity! Many of us wondered where in the Employment Act of 1946 this tolerance of business recession fitted in.

While there are many who believe this recession can and will be kept within the bounds of the 1953-54 recession, there are a growing number who see it as something worse. As of this writing I have hopefully retained membership in the first group.

For purposes of political prediction, there is another aspect of an industrial recession to take into account. It

---

LOUIS BEAN, *a professional economist and statistician whose hobby is political analysis, is the author of* How To Predict Elections.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

is that once a decline in production has added several millions to the unemployment by March, the total is not likely to be reduced materially by October even though the industrial recession bottoms out by summer and picks up a bit in the third quarter. Consequently today's unemployed officially numbering 5.2 million will contribute to Congressional unemployment next summer.

The formula to be applied under these circumstances, a mid-term set-back for the party in power compounded by a business recession, is a simple one. A 10 percent reduction in industrial production during the two-year period between elections costs the party in power about 45 seats and each additional one percent takes another 4 or 5 seats. Therefore if the Administration next October is still talking about the beginning of the start of recovery and industrial production is still bottoming out, or about 10 percent below last year's level of production, you would be justified in chalking up about 45 new seats for the Democrats—more, depending on how far industrial production in the meantime has sagged below its current level by election time.

One more adjustment in your forecast might be required if Eisenhower's popularity continues to decline The Gallup popularity record on Eisenhower declined during his first two years, 1953-1954. It was lifted by the Geneva Conference in 1955, then by the sympathy response to his heart attack and by the Middle East crises just before the 1956 election. It has declined since then to a new low, and if this trend continues, the Republicans could lose a few more seats in districts where the Eisenhower coat-tail still had some carrying power in 1956.

As of today, a forecast of a Democratic gain of as many as 45 seats seems safe; as many as 60, quite possible; more, not improbable. Gallup's latest test of how people would vote for Congressmen corroborates these conclusions based on historical analysis. He finds that a sharp shift to the Democratic side has taken place. Instead of 47 percent who voted for Democratic candidates in 1956 the percentage of those who would do so today is 55 percent. This compares with 53.7 percent in 1948 when the Democrats elected 263 Congressmen and 56.6 percent in 1932 when they elected 313. This would make today's two-party vote look like 285 seats, a gain of about 50 seats over those now held by Democrats.

This marked Democratic rebound in the Gallup surveys takes one back to 1948, with its strong Midwest farm flavor. It was the farm revolt, the green uprising of 1948, against the Republican drive to lower farm price supports to 60 percent of parity which turned the trick for Truman. The same kind of swing has now taken place in the Midwest region of industrial and farm belt states—a swing much more marked here than for the rest of the country outside the South. Gallup's recent findings in the Midwest were corroborated by the February near victory for the Democrats in the first Congressional District of Minnesota. The 1948 farm revolt was foreshadowed by a similar Democratic near victory in 1947 in the third District of Wisconsin.

The Midwest region will contribute most of the Democratic gain next November. And whether the gain is 25 to 45 seats, or 45 to 60 seats, the next Congress is certain to have a more Northern color than the rather evenly divided Congresses of the past decade or two.

Party Representation in the House of Representatives

	Democratic	*Republican*
1933	313	117
1939	262	169
1945	243	190
1949	262	171
1953	211	221
1955	231	203
1957	231	199

One quick check as to where the new blood is likely to come from is to take a look at the GOP marginal seats which the Democrats might pick up in most cases by a 5 percent swing in their direction and by a 7 percent swing in the Midwest, where the Democratic tide is resurging more strongly than in any other area. Gains can be expected to bring in almost equal numbers of Democratic Congressmen from each of four Midwest industrial states, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan and Ohio, and the four farm states, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota and Missouri.

Senatorial prospects for 1958 need to be approached differently. These we reserve for a later occasion. Let it suffice for the present to point out that if the Democrats gain as we predict in the House, they are quite certain to retain all their seats in the Senate and may gain several.

One must agree with President Eisenhower that 1958 is an important year for the GOP—but for the opposite reason. In his Chicago address to Republicans last January, Eisenhower referred to 1958 as the 100th anniversary of the first time Republicans joined a majority in the Congress. He failed to point out (1) that their victory in 1858 was the result of a sharp business depression in 1857-58, just as their gains 20 years ago in 1938 were based on the sharp depression of 1937-38; and (2) that the nation as a whole as well as the party in power suffers from failure to prevent a business depression. The real significance of this 100th anniversary appears rather in the sad fact that this lesson of 100 years of economic-political history did not teach the present Administration not to adopt the credit and expenditure curtailing programs they did last summer without simultaneously providing adequate supporting measures to prevent unemployment. The party in power will probably pay the price for taking chances with unemployment in two installments—the first this fall in the form of 45, 60 or 100 unemployed Republican Congressmen, and the unpredictable balance in 1960.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Three Leaders of "the Opposition"

Adlai E. Stevenson, Pierre

Stevenson: It would be a very unhappy thing if we let the Soviet Union force us into a [Summit] meeting where the United States is further split off from its allies. This is the last thing we should permit to happen. As to this forthcoming meeting, it would be a pity if our expectations were too high. There is, however, a reason for hope and optimism that we might accomplish something on a less exalted scale. Proposals have been made from time to time—as long as two years ago in this country by myself, by Mr. Gaitskell and others abroad—with respect to the discontinuance of the testing of hydrogen weapons (we believe with suitable inspection here— that that's a necessary precaution). At least if this could be accomplished at the Summit this time, this would establish the principle—the mechanics, perhaps—of an inspection system . . . at least look in that direction. And this would break the arms deadlock which it seems to me is the most terrifying aspect of our contemporary scene.

Gaitskell: I was glad to notice that Mr. Stevenson did refer to "this forthcoming meeting," by which I presume he thinks it is going to take place, and that it *is* desirable that it should take place.

Stevenson: Well, I tried to make the point that I thought it would be a pity to be forced into a meeting where the United States is further divided from its allies. Assuming that this can be avoided and that we can reach a suitable agenda, and can have some preliminary talks and have some kind of understanding about what we're going to talk about—I think we should have a meeting, yes.

Gaitskell: There are two rather different views of a Summit conference which one wants to distinguish. On the whole, the Western view — and particularly the United States' view—has been that this should be what I have called an "apex conference," something you reach eventually after there has been a great deal of discussion and threshing out of problems between foreign secretaries, or perhaps between ambassadors. And then, so to speak, "sign on the dotted line" or deal with the remaining problems. And I fully agree that that is one possible way of proceeding, but my impression is that the Russians . . . are thinking of [a Summit meeting] more in terms of what I call the "ice-breaking" type of conference. And personally I think it would be a great pity to turn that down—if, in fact, it becomes clear that that's what the Russians want . . . I would much prefer to see it as a conference which started off a period of negotiation, serious negotiation, which may very well have to be private and certainly at a lower level. That doesn't mean that you wouldn't expect to get anywhere at the Summit conference—you want to make some progress—but you wouldn't *wind it all up.* You would say, "Well, now, we've got these problems, and now that we've made some progress, let the rest of it be handed on to the foreign secretaries or the ambassadors."

Mendès-France: My idea is the same as Mr. Gaitskell's. I think it might be very dangerous to give to international public opinion . . . the feeling that we fear the confrontation of the discussion which the USSR is proposing.

Stevenson: I'm sure it's no secret. I have felt that the position of my government has been too rigid for years in many respects; that may be improving now, I'm happy to say—

Gaitskell: Good!

Stevenson: [However], I don't believe I can embrace the proposition that the attitude of the Russians is "Let's get together and make a start." I wonder if the attitude isn't, perhaps, "Let's get together and make propaganda." . . . I think it's better to know what we are going to talk about in advance, and not permit ourselves to be further divided or on the spot, if that were the consequence. And above all . . . I think it's important that we bear in mind the great lessons from the [Geneva] conference of 1955; that the statesmen of the West must not let people mistake a mood of good humor for a serious movement toward peace.

Gaitskell: I of course agree with Mr. Stevenson that the Soviets may be simply anxious to make propaganda. We don't know that; I think if they have an opportunity they may well do that, and no doubt it will suit their book very well to divide the Western allies. [But] here I very much agree with Mr. Mendès-France that if we refuse the Summit talks, if we adopt a stand-offish and terribly cautious and reserved manner, we play right into the Russian hands. That *is* the sort of propaganda that does divide the allies. And I think myself that if it is a matter of propaganda, good heavens! let us have a little confidence in ourselves; let us surely say to ourselves that we can play that game, too . . . I entirely agree that one doesn't want to give the impression this is the conference to secure permanent peace once and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Discuss "Russia and the West"

Mendes-France, Hugh Gaitskell

for all. I don't believe public opinion thinks in those terms now; they know very well that there are frightfully difficult problems and they would welcome simply a start on it. As for tests, I here entirely agree with Mr. Stevenson. We in the Labour Party in Britain have urged two things for a long time: first of all, that the Russian proposal to suspend nuclear tests, under proper controls but independent of disarmament agreement in other directions, should have been accepted. . . . This is the point at which there is less difference between the Soviets and the West, and I think we could bridge that gap without any serious military risk to ourselves by saying "Right! We'll buy the suspension of tests for the two years that I think Mr. Bulganin proposed in his recent note." And then we would say "Well, now, we'll take that, but now we'll go on—but we warn you that unless within these two years we can reach some further agreement on disarmament, well, don't expect the suspension to go on." Now, that's roughly my point of view, and I think it is pretty much the same as Mr. Stevenson's.

Mendès-France: Mr. Stevenson spoke about the 1955 lesson, and he spoke about this conference as only a conference for a mood of good humor. And that's true. [But] I don't think it was useless, for, after all, good humor is better than bad humor. . . . I feel, perhaps, there were no results because we were not able at this point to bring precise and concrete proposals which might have some impact on public opinion. . . . There was one exception—brought up at this time by the West, and this was the open-sky inspection. Well, this is a very popular idea! It was not useless to have brought that up at this time, and speaking about propaganda, it was a good thing.

Stevenson: What Mr. Mendès-France says seems to me to suggest that we should approach this [Summit] meeting with precise, I believe he said, and carefully considered proposals. This I think is correct. I notice in Mr. Gaitskell's suggestion about the suspension of nuclear testing that it's probably an agreement to do it unilaterally without inspection; it seems to me that while suspending the tests——

Gaitskell: I'm sorry. May I interrupt you there?

Stevenson: Yes.

Gaitskell: I perhaps didn't make myself clear. . . . What I said was, first of all, that we . . . shouldn't have tied [suspension of nuclear tests] to general disarmament agreement. But that would be a *multilateral* agreement to suspend tests. It is fair to add that we in the Labour Party have also said that our government, in order to give a lead in this, should have made and should still make a proposition to suspend their own tests for a limited period in the hope of creating a better atmosphere, and the hope that other people would then join in.

Stevenson: I see. . . .

Gaitskell: There are two proposals, but I took the multilateral one as being the one that's likely to be of the most interest to, well, to both of you.

Stevenson: Well, I think you'd agree that if we could establish the principle of inspection on one another's territory, it would be a step in the direction of broader inspection—the aerial inspection to prevent surprise attacks—this would be an enormous step forward. This would tend to break down the isolation, the secrecy, the mistrust that has existed before and that underlies much of our difficulty. . . . I feel that the package program that our governments have agreed upon to present as a disarmament proposal—the inference being that it must be accepted in whole or not at all—*should* be broken down; and that we should start with inspection, and if it can first relate to suspension of nuclear weapons, an we three could agree upon that, I would have thought we would have made very considerable progress here, as well as at the Summit. . . .

Gaitskell: I find a lot of people who take the view that if you are putting forward proposals for relaxing tension—whether through disarmament or through what we call disengagement, some new idea for trying to get a settlement with the Russians—there are a lot of people who think that that means you're soft on defense, that you no longer care about NATO, that you no longer care about the unity of the West. I want to say emphatically that I think that is absolute nonsense. And I want to declare my own point of view, which is that I've always been a strong supporter of NATO, the Atlantic Alliance, and fully agree with what Mr. Stevenson said earlier on—that we have got to keep up our guard. But I'm equally clear that to stand in a position of sort of frozen immobility . . . without any attempt to reach settlements with the Russians, or indeed cope with the propaganda war, if that's what it is they're conducting—I believe that to do that is in fact fatal to the West; because it undermines the confidence and feeling

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of unity in the West, since so many people are desperately anxious—and goodness know, naturally enough!—to get some settlement. Now, then, *what* sort of settlement? Well, if we take Europe, I think it would be generally agreed that there are two major problems. One is the position of Germany today, and the second is the position of the satellite states. And it is no exaggeration to say that as far as Germany goes, if there were to be, say next year, a rising in East Germany like the one in 1953, a very dangerous situation indeed would develop. Because you will now have a West German army—within a year's time it will be considerably stronger—and there will be an enormous temptation, to put it no higher, for the West Germans to go to the help of their East German comrades the other side of the Iron Curtain. If that were to happen, obviously the danger of World War III is immediately apparent. . . . Equally I don't mind saying that I don't want to get into the position again that we all found ourselves in the autumn of 1956 when the Hungarian uprising took place, and we had to stand by shamed and angry and helpless—because if we had moved in any military sense to help the Hungarian rebels, that might have precipitated World War III, too. If we can't do anything to help them directly—and I would take that for granted—in a military sense, then for heaven's sake let's see if we can do anything diplomatically. That's the background to the disengagement proposals which I would like to put forward. If my two colleagues would agree with that sort of general approach, we could get on to the details.

Mendès-France: We agree it's a good approach.

Stevenson: Everyone agrees that if we could withdraw and restore peace to the world, we'd have achieved the objective that we all seek. The question is how?

Gaitskell: Yes, but I'm putting it more precisely than that. . . . I'll put it the other way round: I know a number of people in Europe and America who really prefer the status quo because they're frightened of any change.

Stevenson: I agree with you: that's foolish.

Gaitskell: Good; that's what I wanted to get out of the way. Now then, we have put forward a plan for the past 18 months, and I'd like to begin with that if I may. It's a quite straight-forward five-point plan involving the following changes:

First of all, the withdrawal of foreign forces from East and West Germany, from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary.

Second, an international control over the conventional *national* forces—or indeed, if you like, nuclear as well—but an international control over the *national forces* allowed to that area, and of course agreed with the countries in that area. So that that in itself, the second point, is really a pilot scheme in locally-controlled disarmament.

Third, the reunification of Germany.

And fourth, the signing of a security pact under which the frontiers of these countries would be guaranteed mutually by the countries themselves and by the great powers.

And finally, provided all the rest is agreed, then I would say . . . West Germany and East Germany . . . withdraw from NATO; Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary withdraw from the Warsaw Pact.

That is the full plan for what we call a neutral zone or a neutral belt. Now, I believe that if that could be agreed, it would be an enormous advance; it would first of all bring you your experiment in controlled disarmament, it would secondly solve the German problem and reduce the danger from that, and it would thirdly at least advance the prospect of a greater degree of freedom and independence for the three satellite states. . . . People will say to you "This would be terribly dangerous for the West," and at the same time they will say "Russia, of course, will never do it!" Well, I don't think both those criticisms can be true. I don't myself think it is dangerous to the West, but I do admit it may well be that, to start with, the Russians would be very unwilling to go as far as this. Which brings me—if I may just bring it in, and then I'll shut up—to the more limited proposal which starts from the Rapacki Plan, a plan for a nuclear free zone in the two Germanies, in Poland, and in Czechoslovakia. I have said many times, and say it again, "That's not enough for me." But I think if you could move on from the Rapacki Plan as it stands to bring in conventional forces as well, and at any rate the reduction of foreign forces, you are achieving one objective; you are achieving your limited-control disarmament. . . . I repeat: I would like to see the whole program put forward by the West, even assuming the Russians aren't prepared to go all that way now. Let's start putting our propositions forward, and then let us negotiate with them, and let's see whether we can't get some disengagement here which reduces the danger of a flare-up and also gives us, as I say—and this continues what Mr. Stevenson was saying earlier—the experiment in controlled disarmament in a limited field. Because I'm frankly doubtful, in the light of our experience with the Disarmament Committee, whether we're going to get the Russians—or the United States, for that matter—to jump straightaway into full international control of all their armies at home.

Stevenson: I don't exclude the possibility of making progress with respect to disengagement. In fact, I would go so far as to say that I think disengagement will be the ultimate solution of the relations between East and West—that you can't have foreign armies glowering at each other over international boundaries, with any security, indefinitely. I wish, however, I share [Mr. Gaitskell's] confidence that we're in a position now where we could proceed with much security in this direction. I am obliged to recall that it wasn't long ago in Hungary where the first manifestations of a democratic evolution or developments immediately resulted in the re-entry of the Russian troops. Well, now, if we withdraw all of our forces from Central and Eastern Europe, the Russians withdraw to their boundaries, the United States withdraws clear across the Atlantic—

Gaitskell: I'm sorry, I must clear that up! I've never said that, Mr. Stevenson; and I must disassociate myself from some assumptions of Mr. Kennan on that point, though even he didn't say that—he said [withdrawal] only to Britain. . . . I've always said NATO

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

goes on, and British and American forces remain in Europe—not in Western Germany. Sorry!

Stevenson: Not at all—that's a very proper correction . . . if we withdraw, isn't it likely to be assumed that the same thing takes place? [The Soviets] re-enter again. Would *we* re-enter? And if we do, haven't we asked for the very thing that we're trying to avoid, a collision? Or what if we don't? Then they're back in and we're out. Now, the other point that you made about the withdrawal: I was competently informed in Europe last summer that there was nowhere else for the American forces to go but Germany. But if there are other places for them to go, that certainly improves the situation a great deal.

Mendès-France: I will speak very quickly on that point, because Mr. Gaitskell spoke quite at length on the very large plan, which I might call a German neutralization plan or something like that—or a central Europe neutralization plan. That's a very large thing and I must make some reservations about some ideas which he said he favored. I should prefer to insist on the other scheme which he mentioned because this one is at present under discussion. That's the Rapacki Plan, which of course is not as ambitious as the first one. I must say that, subject to certain amendments or changes, I think the Rapacki approach might be studied with realism. . . . It might be a good experiment to have some place in the world which, after all, is the most dangerous point—in Central Europe, where the two blocs are elbow-by-elbow—it might be a good thing to have there some test of the way the control of armaments could work. And this is the reason why I think we must not refuse these proposals; we have to see how it could work and what kind of amendments we could propose. At the same time, I wish to add one thing: that my idea doesn't mean that we must go as far as the departure of the US troops from Germany or continental Europe. I think that the presence of American troops is in every way a guarantee for peace, and that any scheme which we might prefer and study will include the presence of US troops on continental Europe and in Western Germany.

Gaitskell: As far as Mr. Mendès-France is concerned, I think he and I are in agreement about the Rapacki proposals and the kind of thing that might come out of them. The only thing I would insist myself is that it's no use just having a nuclear free zone; you must have a zone under which there is control over conventional forces as well. They should be reduced, and equally I would like to see some reduction in foreign forces. As regards Mr. Stevenson's two points, that there is nowhere else for the American troops to go—I find that rather astonishing. I think there are only four divisions of American troops in Europe, which is not an enormous number; there's the whole of the Low Countries and France and Britain, and I wouldn't have thought it was impossible to contain them there—if, indeed, as many American troops would be necessary in this new and I hope more relaxed situation. I repeat: I certainly want to see American forces in some form or other retained, for the time being, on the continent of Europe. The other point was his argument that if you did have my full plan, then the Soviet forces would withdraw, the Communist regimes would be overthrown, and back the Soviet troops would come. Well, of course the logic of that, Mr. Stevenson, is rather horrifying, you know—because it implies that you must not do anything which could possibly disturb the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe. And *that* I find it very difficult to stomach. But my answer, I think, would be two-fold. First of all, if there is a security pact, a guarantee of the frontiers, then the re-entry of Russian forces would be a breach of that agreement. That is what I've got in mind; and therefore it would give the West the right to re-enter, and of course you would be back where you were or something like it—

Stevenson: Or else you would be in a major war.

Gaitskell: Well, you might be in a major war, but I don't think it's any more likely than you would be now. But the second point I would make is this: that if you make a pact of this kind—and the Russians make it—it seems to me in the highest degree unlikely that they will not have taken for granted that they are going to lose complete control over these areas. In any event, I am not suggesting that this is the sort of thing that the Russians will agree to tomorrow. I think this will take years of negotiation, and I think the more limited proposals that we've been talking about may well be a stage in that direction. But I repeat: I do find it extremely hard to accept from anybody—and I'm in a way, if I may say so, surprised that it comes from *you*—this notion that the one thing we must not do is in any way to shake these regimes, because then the Russians will do something or other which will precipitate a third world war. That really is . . . too defeatist a view.

Stevenson: I said at the outset that I did not exclude the possibility—indeed, I suspected that disengagement was the only ultimate solution of our problem in Western Europe. I should have thought that at this moment —practically in the shadow of what happened in Hungary, in East Germany, and in Poznan—the idea now that we could view with any confidence the democratic evolution of these countries, with the withdrawal of control by the Soviet Union, seems quite unlikely. I hope very much that I am wrong about that.

Gaitskell: That's a different argument, if I may say so. It is quite unlikely that the Russians at the moment will agree, as I said earlier on, either to the full evacuation of foreign forces or to the reunification of Germany—which things go together. But what I don't like, and I hope I haven't been too rude, is this argument presented by the present Government in the House of Commons the other day that upset us a good deal. . . . I would like to see the Western powers showing far more initiative than they have done in putting forward positive proposals for peace.

Stevenson: I get upset by my government's arguments every day!

Gaitskell: You understand my point of view, then.

[*The above has been excerpted from a Trans-Atlantic conversation which was presented over the CBS Radio Network on March 12, 1958.*]

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Case for Disengagement — II

A Blueprint for Mutual Withdrawal

by DENIS HEALEY

DISENGAGEMENT is no longer a dirty word in the Western diplomatic vocabulary. In principle, most NATO governments now recognize that disengagement might offer a way out of their current dilemmas. But so far, most of the supporters of disengagement have either left their ideas too vague for serious discussion or have arbitrarily tied disengagement to other conceptions which are even more controversial. George Kennan, for example, in his Reith Lectures, did as much as any other single person to awaken international interest in the idea of disengagement. But by linking disengagement with an exceptionally revolutionary conception of defense strategy, he made it easy for his opponents to shoot down the two ideas together. Even so, few of those who have exploited Mr. Acheson's attack on Professor Kennan to justify the rigid complacency of existing policies realize that Mr. Acheson himself envisages disengagement in Central Europe as a possible alternative—though he believes that:

> a further process of evolution is necessary, both within the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, before a change to more complete national identity in the latter can take place without erupting into a violence which might engulf the world. When that evolution occurs, Russian and American troop withdrawals may be possible without destroying the basis of American association in the security of Europe. (*Power and Diplomacy*, p. 93.)

If the advantages and disadvantages of disengagement are to be compared with those of continuing the status quo, a model scheme for disengagement must be considered which is specific on certain points—namely, the area concerned, the political and military status of the countries disengaged, the nature of the control mechanism and the military sanctions available to the West if the control mechanism fails. The plan which I outline below is not, of course, the only possible one, but I believe that it is realistic enough to illustrate the major problems which must be faced by both East and West.

Since disengagement can only come about by agreement among Russia, NATO and the countries disengaged, at least two preconditions must be met. The plan must involve approximately equivalent concessions by both Russia and the West, and it must offer all parties military security and political stability at least equal to that which they can expect if present policies continue.

These preconditions go far toward determining the area from which the opposing forces disengage. If the troop withdrawals were from East and West Germany alone, the West would be conceding much more than Russia. The Federal Republic is nearly three times larger and more populous than the Soviet Zone of Germany and many times more wealthy. Moreover, while Russia could abandon Eastern Germany without any substantial change or weakening in her strategic position, NATO would have to face a drastic revision in its whole military posture. There are also obvious political dangers for the West in leaving a neutral Germany in direct contact with Soviet power, so long as Russia is able to bid for its support by offering territorial concessions at the expense of Poland. In my view military and political considerations alike insist that the area of disengagement should include at least Poland and Czechoslovakia as well as the whole of Germany.

On the other hand, the West could not at this time consider withdrawing from the European continent entirely, even if, as Khrushchev has repeatedly proposed, Russia withdrew from the whole of Eastern Europe. Once again the West would be giving up far more than the Russians. America would have to cross the Atlantic Ocean while Russia withdrew a few hundred miles across land to her own country. It would be infinitely easier, politically as well as logistically, for the Russians to return than for the Americans. Thus the only military response available to the West if Russia attempted to reoccupy the area disengaged would be by strategic air power—a concept at present inseparable from global thermonuclear war. If, as I argued in my first article, a strategy of massive retaliation is losing its validity even for the protection of allied countries, it is likely to be even less suitable for the protection of neutrals.

Thus NATO must keep a military foothold on the continent of Europe, both as a political pledge of its concern with the integrity of the disengaged zone, and as a base for military sanctions short of global war if that integrity is challenged. Such a foothold must include at least France and the Low Countries. The territorial limits of a disengaged zone can thus be defined as follows: Russia must evacuate at least Eastern Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia; the West must remain in at least the Low Countries and France. It might be possible to include some other countries on each side, maintaining of course the same balance of political and military concessions. The countries thus exposed by the withdrawal of Russian and NATO forces would have to be militarily neutralized, or they might themselves decide to upset the new balance by opting to join one side or the other. There would have to be a formal treaty commitment by all concerned to maintain the neutrality of the zone of disengagement, and to join in defending it if necessary. This new European Security Pact would

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

need supporting by certain physical guarantees.

Thus the neutral countries themselves would be limited to conventional armaments alone, at a level mutually agreed, and both sides would join in inspection to verify and control the limitations. In this respect, the neutral zone would be the world's first pilot project in the techniques of disarmament. For this and other reasons there is much to be said for involving the United Nations directly in the work of inspection. In addition to ground control teams along the lines already envisaged by the Disarmament Subcommittee of the United Nations, it would be desirable to move the early warning system of each side to the far frontier of the neutral zone and to allow mutual air inspection for 500 miles beyond it. This would much increase both US and Soviet security against surprise attack by conventional forces.

In my opinion these disarmament provisions, once established, would in themselves go far to reduce the danger of a military violation of the neutral area from outside. Nevertheless, it is fear of impotence against such a violation which explains most of the official opposition to disengagement at the present time. However much the likelihood of Russian military aggression against the neutral area may be reduced by political or other measures, the West will not lightly accept disengagement unless it is satisfied that it can devise an effective response to such a challenge. Nor is the threat of massive retaliation alone likely to satisfy this proviso.

IN addition to machinery for warning against surprise attack, I believe the response to aggression against the neutral area should have three components. In the first place, the neutral countries themselves should have sufficient conventional forces to deal with a frontier incident or to identify and hold up a major attack—this is the role of NATO's conventional forces in protecting the present status quo. It is probable such conventional forces could cope with Soviet airborne formations if they were not immediately reinforced by large land armies.

In case of a major aggression, NATO would intervene with air support for the local forces, including nuclear weapons if necessary. NATO would also move ground troops into the neutral zone from its base west of Germany, to take up a position as a trip-wire along the same sort of line as they occupy today. Thus at worst, even if the Russians reoccupied much of Eastern Europe, they could not move into Western Germany without running risks almost identical with those they run at present. In fact, once NATO abandons its original forward strategy, as now seems inevitable whether there is disengagement or not, it will have to fall back on a strategy which would be just as suitable for defending a neutral area as the present status quo. Indeed disengagement would have the positive military advantage for NATO that if aggression took place, resistance would start on the Soviet frontier instead of in Central Germany—with all the resulting benefits of added space and time.

In his article last week, DENIS HEALEY argued that military disengagement in Central Europe is "by far the most hopeful issue on which to concentrate at Summit talks." All-out Cold War, wrote Britain's influential Labourite MP, threatens both the Soviet Union and the West with "economic ruin and political collapse." Moreover, he asked, even if the West *could* afford to purchase "a balance of terror," what of the coming disequilibrium when a wider and wider range of powers acquire nuclear weapons? Both sides now see the logic in arms limitation; but disarmament can start only with "a pilot scheme . . . in an area [Central Europe] . . . which, with the development of long-range atomic striking power, is no longer indispensable to the security of either America or Russia."

Here, Mr. Healey offers a model for East-West withdrawals, and in his concluding article next week he will discuss how both sides can be encouraged to move by stages toward disengagement.

But what of the neutral countries themselves? Are the East European countries to be regarded as expendable in case of major aggression? I do not believe so. If only the West can rid itself of the illusion that there is no substitute for victory, it can exploit the infinite spectrum of modern weapons to develop a military posture which offers not only the probability of deterring aggression at any level but also the near certainty of halting any aggression which nevertheless takes place *before* the enemy has achieved his objective. The problem is not to convince the Soviet leaders that the West would rather destroy humanity than permit a single Russian soldier to cross another's frontier. It is to show them that the West has the capacity to make them pay more for using force than they can hope to gain by it.

The immense variety in the range and destructive power of modern weapons makes it technically possible to limit the use of force to the minimum which is necessary for this purpose, and liberates diplomacy and strategy from many of the restrictions which used to be imposed by space and time. Significantly, Britain was able to use strategic bombers based in the United Kingdom to support troops in Port Said, more than 2,000 miles away.

On the other hand, the very continuity of the weapons spectrum leaves a marginal uncertainty whether acceptable limits could be maintained in actual fighting, and this enormously increases the risks which a potential aggressor must be prepared to face. Parallel with the increased risks which war presents, the Sputnik has shown that it is both easier, cheaper and infinitely less dangerous for a country like Russia to win influence by exploiting the ample resources already inside her fron-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tiers than by using force in trying to expand them.

Thus, I believe, it would be possible for the West to organize effective military sanctions for the protection of the neutral area. It is often objected that no military guarantee can possibly replace the deterrent value of having American troops actually in position on the threatened frontier. It is probably true that Russia would hesitate longer before killing American GI's than before challenging a purely written American commitment. But this argument can be grossly exaggerated. Turkey—and Russia—both considered an American warning sufficient to prevent war during the Syrian crisis last year, although Russia could have crossed the Turkish frontier without killing a single American soldier.

Turkey is not the only member of NATO in this position. Greece, Norway and Denmark could all be invaded by the Red Army without the physical involvement of American troops. The Eisenhower Doctrine commits America to armed intervention in the Middle East even if her own soldiers are not threatened. Yugoslavia is similarly protected by purely verbal guarantees. The argument that the presence of American soldiers is an indispensable precondition of American intervention makes nonsense, not only of most of America's existing treaty commitments but of the UN Charter itself.

KOREA is often cited to prove that the withdrawal of American troops may provoke aggression. But the true lesson of Korea is very different. What invited Communist aggression in Korea was not the withdrawal of troops in itself, but America's failure to make it clear that she would intervene if aggression did take place. Indeed both General MacArthur and Secretary Acheson stated publicly in the early months of 1950 that America had no strategic interest in Korea. This gave the green light for Communist aggression. Yet nevertheless America did intervene, and brought the United Nations in with her. In other words she proved her readiness to protect a neutral country in which she had neither strategic interest nor treaty obligation. After this experience the Russians would be triply cautious about testing America's will to implement treaty obligations for the protection of a European neutral belt in whose integrity she had a stated strategic interest.

In fact it is inconceivable that Russia would ever agree to withdraw from Eastern Europe if she had any intention of later returning by force—the risks she would run by changing the status quo would then be out of all proportion to the advantages of her present position. It seems to me that the Western powers would not agree to disengagement if they thought the political consequences were likely to constitute an intolerable provocation to Soviet aggression. For this reason, the withdrawal of military forces from Central Europe is impossible without an agreed solution of the major political problems of the area—otherwise disengagement might well mean greater instability and greater risk of war than the very unsatisfactory status quo at present. On the other hand, the political problems of Central Europe, which have baffled statesmen for the last 13 years, offer much better prospects of solution in the context of military disengagement and political neutrality.

German reunification is the best example. There is no chance whatever that the Soviet Union will accept the present Western conditions for German reunification—which imply that the Pankow regime should be liquidated by free elections and that a united Germany should then join NATO, thus advancing Western military power to the Polish frontier. It is equally inconceivable that the West should accept the present Soviet condition that the Pankow regime should be the sole channel for negotiation on the problem. For so long as the Red Army remains in Eastern Germany, the Pankow regime is simply Russian Military Government.

But if negotiations on German reunification took place in the context of military disengagement, both sides could afford major concessions. Russia's security would not be affected one way or the other by the establishment of a united and democratic Germany. And the Pankow regime would be under heavy and continuous pressure by the population of Eastern Germany: in this situation the West Germans could afford to negotiate the modalities of reunification with Pankow. I have not met a single German of any party who feels that if the Red Army left Eastern Germany it would be necessary to insist on free elections as a precondition of reunification.

The other major diplomatic problem which would require solution before disengagement was complete is the Polish-German frontier. Here again a solution would be simpler in the context of a neutralized area. I believe that the Germans would be prepared to accept the existing Oder-Neisse line with minor rectifications if the Soviet Zone were simultaneously to achieve its freedom.

But besides these international problems inside the neutral zone there is the problem of ensuring a peaceful and gradual evolution toward greater freedom in the satellite states themselves. Mr. Acheson is right in saying that the Russians would not evacuate these countries unless they were sure that their withdrawal would not be a signal for violent revolution—and conversely, unless they were prepared to tolerate a process of peaceful change which might be to their disadvantage. For this reason if no other it is most unlikely that they would agree to total evacuation at the present time. On the other hand, once negotiations begin between Russia and the West on the general principle of disengagement, the evolution in Eastern Europe will steadily accelerate, and the dangers of a violent explosion will diminish.

The full program of disengagement I have outlined in this article would take years, not months, to carry out. The immediate problem is how and when to make a start. That is the theme of my next and final article.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BOOKS & COMMENT

The American Small Town

by Richard Hoggart

THIS three-years study of the people of Springdale (the fictitious name for a township in upper New York State) ends on a resoundingly affirmative note:

> Because they do not recognize their defeat, they are not defeated. The compromises, the self-deceptions and the self-avoidance are mechanisms which work . . . they are able to cope . . . in a way that permits some degree of satisfaction.

Such an affirmation might satisfy an animal-lover questioning a breeder of hens or hamsters. Since human lives are here summed-up, one remains obstinately unsatisfied. Is "defeat" for us only a matter of whether we ourselves recognize it? Are "mechanisms of satisfaction" enough if they work only by self-deception and self-avoidance? Perhaps the authors couldn't bear to leave their 300 pages of sad evidence almost entirely unqualified and desperately tacked on this inadequate final paragraph.

Small Town in Mass Society — Class, Power and Religion in a Rural Community, by Arthur J. Vidich and Joseph Bensman (Princeton; $6).

Certainly their book is as depressing as any I have read in years. May I be preserved from ever having to live in this sort of small town, must be a reader's first comment. Of course, the picture may not be really true to life; it may illustrate the inevitable limits of much formal sociological procedure. Vidich and Bensman studied social relations inside the community, in politics, religion and class, and the community's relations with larger powers outside. The result is —to quote now from their *penultimate* paragraph—"defeat . . . impotence . . . self-deception . . . self-avoidance . . . compromise."

The proviso one is entering all the time while reading is that much about these people must surely have been left out; that a more organic, whole, inward observation (that of a good novelist, say —not that of a folksy small-town romancer) would surely produce a picture less consistently darkened with an air of the mechanistic and mean. Here I am reminded of the difference between some British sociological writings of the more formal kind and some of those now being published by the Institute of Community Studies (*Family and Kinship in East London; The Family Life of Old People*) in which a very special effort is made to enter, through a sort of disciplined impressionism, into the imaginative "thisness" of a community's life and values.

FOR all that, the evidence here is sufficient to suggest that at this moment of time—when Western industrial societies are half-centralized and half-composed of dying local cultures — their small towns are peculiarly uneasy places to live in. Big enough to be self-conscious and raddled with the impotences of minor power; not big enough to have any intellectual leaven or to allow splinter groups and odd dissident individuals to go their own way; conformist and dog-in-the-manger conservative — they have the faults of both hamlets and cities, with few of their virtues. "Every culture lives inside its own dream": but some dreams are more stimulating to the spirit than others. The rural small town's dream of its own excellence—full of just plain folks who are more honest and simple, friendly and neighborly, than city folks, living in the best little town on the whole globe—is too little touched by either the tough nonconformist conscience or the raddled saving cynicism of the open-eyed city-dweller.

Vidich and Bensman's view is that such a group is today driven further into this self-deluding dream by the spreading encroachment of mass society. Since the small town with mores of its own is becoming increasingly an anachronism, it seems able to exist only by virtue of sustained self-deception. The cars, en route from one great suburban center to another, which roar quickly through the straggling township, illustrate its real social situation. In all that counts outside the inner personal life, real power lies more and more outside Springdale. The Springdalers unconsciously know this and are ambivalent towards outside powers. They scorn, they woo, they retreat further into their self-congratulatory dream. Meanwhile paralysis settles on those small areas of activity where there is still room for local decision. The gap between assertion and reality widens:

> The public enactment of community life and public statements of community values seemed to bear little relationship to the community's operating institutions and the private lives of its members.

WE KNOW the mass-media can widen horizons and help to spread sweetness and light; and along this line may lie our best hope of decent development. In Springdale at present, though, the mass-media's less pleasant gifts are more evident — the glossy generalized consumption-values and the sex-and-horror production. Worse, the media's own cultural stereotypes push the small town towards further self-deception. In these stereotypes city slickers are vicious, country folk pure and idyllic (in Britain we have a phenomenally popular soap-opera, *The Archers,* about farming folks):

> It is uniquely ironic that the self-image of the rural community and its image of urban life are in part the products of the penetration of urban mass-media.

At this point Vidich and Bensman make their most striking observation:

> Basically, an historically indigenous local culture does not seem to exist. The cultural imports of each decade and generation and the successive waves of migration . . . produce a local culture consisting of layers or segments of the mass culture of successive historical eras . . . The conflict between "spurious" and "genuine" culture appears to be a conflict between two different ages of "spurious" culture.

If an Englishman draws attention to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

these hard words he may well be suspected of a characteristic snobbery. Let me try, though, as objectively as I can to comment on them in the light of my own experience of British urban working-class communities.

What strikes me first about Springdale is the sense that many of its values have been, so to speak, picked up from outside (often as a commercially watered-down version of the inspiring American "dream") rather than evolved by challenge and response over the generations. Second, I'm struck—against my left-wing inclinations—by the realization that an admittedly hierarchical class-society can help the individual a great deal. We know about the evils of class in Britain. But at this moment, when class is becoming less significant to us, it may be as well also to recall that an accepted sense of class saved you from a number of ills. You weren't forever seeking your own identity; you were able to take a lot of things for granted simply because a sort of dramatic pattern had been laid down in advance; you "knew where you were," who belonged to you and who weren't your kind; you had an assurance in following the forms of your group which could be just as liberating as it was inhibiting. You never had to worry about what kind of table-setting went with your present status (or run to *Good Housekeeping* and *Vogue* to find out); you just *knew* whether this was or was not an occasion for getting down the three-shilling tin of salmon from the kitchen top-shelf. You weren't hag-ridden by the gap between public egalitarian assumptions and the plain evidence of prestige-differentiation run riot. You weren't permanently frustrated after forty, or nursing the ulcer your overwork caused—your group assumed that ambition was a meanly competitive and unfriendly way of living, not that it was the mainspring of society.

SPRINGDALE'S running sores are the shack people, those who have contracted out of the prevailing ideology, "the residual scrapheap of the competitive economic process." They can't belong even in the way that the appallingly scruffy people up the back lane of an English village belong; they haven't even a tap-root in common with the rest. At the other extreme are Springdale's three book-clubs for women which provide a kind of culture-class. Naturally, they arouse extreme irritation. We have railed for years at the correlation between class-status and cultural opportunity in Great Britain. We were right. On the other hand, our traditional situation saved us from the ills of culture as conspicuous consumption or culture as identity- and status-endower ("all vice-presidents' wives are this month reading . . . ": "The nuptials were celebrated this week of Miss Jane Johnson, Bryn Mawr '55 and Lt. (j.g.) John Jackson, Penn. State '54"). Underlining much in such recent writers as Riesman and Whyte, Vidich and Bensman conclude that social class (through stylized consumption) is replacing economic class as the basis for esteem.

Some of the older local communities in Britain—as in the United States also—have retained the elements of an indigenous culture; they at least began their adjustment to the forces of mass society with a constitution which possessed considerable roughage, texture and resilience. In *Village on the Border* Frankenberg recently studied the effects of mass society on a Welsh border village. He was struck by the subtlety, the irony, the muscular Dylan Thomasish scattiness of their power to take charge on their own terms. Young and Wilmott, studying the London working-class area Bethnal Green and its successor, an outlying modern housing-estate, were so impressed by the tough tentacular roots of local culture and attitudes that they recommended rehousing people on the spot, to preserve the roots.

One's immediate reaction—that such a solution would be only a finger in the dyke against the flood of mass and centralized influences—underlines the fact that our problems are the same as those of the United States. Only the point of departure is often different. In one sense we are worse off, because less self-critical; our older forms can and do blind us to the speed with which change is coming.

THE common problem remains: how to make the best of modern mass society whilst allowing room for the individual soul to grow. Like any observer of the British scene, Vidich and Bensman find themselves moved more than anything else by the "saving minority." The one ray of light in this book is the discovery that such people exist. They exist in Bryce, the "deeply religious and selfless" clergyman; they exist in Grainger, the 4H agent whose "activities sometimes transcend his good sense and actually threaten his occupational position . . . he always appears to be engaging in quixotic adventures" (bless Grainger! there's the germ of a powerful novel in that short sketch); they exist in the few who persist in that most unpopular of pursuits, reading, and who engage in

> . . . self-reflection and a consideration of the meaning of existence . . . they are disturbed because they cannot communicate their insight to others . . . [they have] sufficient strength to be tolerant, kindly and understanding. They contain, absorb and live with their own perceptions and insights even though this is at a great cost to themselves.

Unmistakably, they are—the echo is extraordinary—Matthew Arnold's "aliens" and as much needed today, in all parts of this hemisphere, as they ever were.

Storm

THE STORM began to prove *the world will end.*
The sun went out; the night came on as noon.
Earth is not earth when skies not sky descend.
Vanishing birds refrained the time: Too soon,

Too soon, they cried, all out of key with song
Practiced earlier when the sun played fair.
The grasses faulted green and whispered wrong.
The full leaves fell before the fall was near.

And no one knew the time, and no one knew
The place, and no one knew why fury shone,
And wondered if the sky had once been blue,
And wondered what had come and what had gone.

JOHN FANDEL

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

One of Communism's Children

by Hans Rogger

WOLFGANG LEONHARD'S *Child of the Revolution* is neither a very profound nor a very novel kind of book. Yet it is more than just another addition to the growing literature of disenchantment with Communism. Others before Leonhard had "chosen freedom" but his break with the system that had shaped him led him, not to the West, but to Tito's Yugoslavia. This was in 1949, at the height of the Yugoslavs' bitter dispute with Russia and the Cominform and a great many years before Dedijer's fall from favor and Djilas' imprisonment. Since that time, Leonhard has travelled further west, to St. Anthony's College at Oxford; whether he has done so in more than a geographical sense, only those who know him personally can tell.

Child of the Revolution, by Wolfgang Leonhard, with an introduction by Edward Crankshaw, translated from the German by C. M. Woodhouse (Regnery; $6.50).

When his book first appeared in Germany in 1955 (and when I first read it), Khrushchev's revelations about Stalin had not yet broken upon an astonished world; Poland's October and Hungary's revolution were still in the future and Djilas' *New Class* was not yet published. *Child of the Revolution* sheds a great deal of light on the political and psychological processes that led to these events, particularly on the wide participation of young people in them. Its attempts to come to terms with the reality of Stalinism and the search for a socialist alternative proceed from Marxist and Leninist sources. In this, Leonhard is typical of young dissidents throughout the Communist world. Young Poles and Hungarians were not, in the fall of 1956, thinking of a return to a West which they had never known; nor had their alienation from their own environment led them to an uncritical acceptance of Western views. They rejected Communism's moral devastation, the betrayal of its own ideals, the sterility of official doctrine and the bureaucratization of every creative impulse. They called for a liberation from cant and constraint, for a return to the pure sources of socialism and the realization of its humanitarian and egalitarian implications.

Like many Hungarian and Polish students, Leonhard was a product of Communism. The son of active German Communists, he was taken by his mother to the Soviet Union in 1935, when he was thirteen. He attended school in Russia, joined the Young Communist League, was trained as a Comintern functionary and finally returned to Germany in May, 1945, in the train of the Soviet armies to work in leading spots in the Soviet zone. His is an intensely sober, almost coldly detached political biography in which the political events, political formulations, political contradictions of the Communist world are vastly more important than private or personal concerns. Details of personal life or of the everyday world in Russia and East Germany are almost totally absent from his record of those years, but in this fashion the strengths and limitations of life in the upper echelons of Communism are more fully revealed. It is a life in which private passions, the price of butter and bread seem less important than the meaning and correct interpretation of the latest party directives.

The isolation of the elite is not, Leonhard suggests, either accident or purely a reward for loyalty. It is a necessary protection for consciences, especially among the young, whose generous instincts or too literal reading of an egalitarian doctrine, might conflict with harsh reality. For Leonhard himself, the glaring inequities of Soviet life, which he observed when as a German alien he was a temporarily underprivileged member of Soviet society, were an important waystation on the road to his own awakening.

ONE SENSES an almost romantic yearning for the good old days of revolutionary Communism, of comradely warmth and a shared enthusiasm for high ideals. Like all visions of a golden age, this too has as many elements of myth as it has of history (from some of Leonhard's pages Lenin and the early Bolsheviks emerge as the stoutest advocates of intellectual freedom), but it is a myth that serves as an indictment of the bureaucratic ossification of Communism in power and of the organization men who keep it there. The vision is of no help, of course, in solving the more fundamental question which Leonhard does not pose—whether the degeneration of proletarian power is not implicit in a one-party state led by a self-appointed elite. This question is being asked ever more insistently in Eastern Europe, and Tito's pragmatic answer to it may well have caused Leonhard to move on to Oxford.

That there are vast inequalities in Communist society is no longer a revelation. Leonhard in addition makes us aware of a kind of inequality which has been too little noted in Western writings. Differential access to information plays as much of a role as do sharply graded pay scales and styles of life. In a society in which rumor is the only unofficial means of communication, it is a treasured privilege to gain access to real news, to reliable information. The higher you rise in the hierarchy, the higher the trust placed in you, the broader and the more accurate the range of information to which it is thought safe to expose you. This may create a sense of belonging, a sense of power over the environment among those who enjoy this advantage, but it may also be the first exposure to reality. For Leonhard it proved to be the latter.

SIGNIFICANTLY, it was Communist oppositional ideas that Leonhard was exposed to in this fashion. Here were thought processes and demonstrations that he could understand and respond to, not the West's endless invocation of a freedom that seemed abstract and formal, nor its gratuitous insistence on a superior standard of living. He has nothing but contempt for the West's complete misunderstanding of the intellectual and moral dilemma of thinking men in the East, and finds that demonstrable accuracy and a serious confrontation with Marxism are the only things which will gain a hearing for the West.

The conclusion appears to be that the political and intellectual emancipation of Communists must be the work of Communists. The West's task is to help rather than hinder the process.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Twenty-Three Went Fishing

by William F. Neuman

SHORTLY before sitting down with Ralph Lapp's latest book, *The Voyage of the Lucky Dragon,* I made my annual pilgrimage to the local "art" theatre, this time to see Maria Schell's magnificent portrayal of *Gervaise.* Based on Emile Zola's angry cry against the injustice of fate, the film is an almost clinical study of the struggles of the hapless Gervaise hopelessly enmeshed in the web of circumstance. The movie carries an impact that is not lightly thrown off. It was easy, therefore, to recapture the feeling of frustration and despair when reading the account of the twenty-three Japanese fishermen who went out to catch tuna and endured six weeks of struggle against misfortune, only to return with a boat load of "Shi No Hai," the "ashes of death." For those who enjoy strong doses of drama, I strongly recommend this schedule I happened upon by chance. First, see *Gervaise* then, while still in a despairing mood, read Lapp's book. Actually, if Lapp were a Zola, it would be necessary to set one's mood ahead of time. The story of the fishermen, in the hands of the rare literary giant, could be made to shout its moral down the corridors of time. Lapp modestly vacillates between the approach of a novelist and that of a reporter, but he does cause the story to speak in loud, compelling terms.

The Voyage of the Lucky Dragon, by Ralph Lapp (Harper; $3.50).

Ralph Lapp, as you may know, is a physicist only recently turned writer. To my mind, a scientist's training in dispassionate analysis is perhaps the most serious handicap a would-be writer can have. Lapp writes well enough. His sentences are short and clipped. His story-line has good continuity. He has carefully built in the feeling of suspense. But, he stops to document, to prove and to analyze. He recognizes that the human side of the story carries a message from history for the future, but the reader doesn't get to *know* the fishermen; rather, the reader only gets to know *about* the fishermen. One sees the troubles, the inevitable course of uncontrolled destiny, but one isn't made to feel, to live the fishermen's frustrations and tragedy.

Like Lapp, I have been fascinated by the Lucky Dragon incident but, from the little research I've done, a number of questions arose which could weaken the force of the story's moral. The Fishing Master, Misaki, was no ordinary fisherman. There was the secret decision by the boat-owner and Misaki *not* to fish Indonesian waters where previous catches had been good. There was radio silence from the trawler though some of the crew had seen the explosion and many crewmen were ill. It appeared to men on the scene that Misaki was shielded from all contacts with Americans. Lapp explains most of these mysterious circumstances to his own satisfaction. If one accepts Lapp's conclusion that the trawler's position at the time of the nuclear test was entirely accidental, then the moral stands firm and clear.

What is the message the fishermen would tell us? It is the age-old theme that man, after all is said and done, is not the Captain of his soul, the Master of his fate. It is important that we *try* to alter the inexorable progress of circumstance, but too often events beyond our control take command. The fishermen were humble, honest men whose horizons were limited by birth. It was their lot to struggle with the sea. They could not hope to rise very far from their inheritance, but there was always a chance that their children might.

So these men put to sea to seek the elusive tuna in the broad expanses of the Pacific. Under the best of circumstances, it is difficult to wrest a good harvest from the sea. It is long hours of back-breaking work interrupted by storms and mishaps. The voyage of the Lucky Dragon suffered bad luck from the very beginning. Plagued by engine trouble, storms, loss of fishing lines and poor catches, the fishermen worked their way "across thousands of miles of the vast Pacific to [their] date with destiny near a tiny atoll." There, through a caprice of nature, an unexpected shift of wind, the trawler was thoroughly dusted with intense fallout from the superbomb exploded almost ninety miles away by the Atomic Energy Commission in cooperation with the US Armed Services.

THESE men had broken no law of man of of nature. Their mistake, it seems, was to seek fish in a world polarized into two opposing camps of irreconcilable ideologies. For this mistake, they received almost lethal exposure to gamma irradiation and suffered intense, superficial beta-burns. Fortunately only one fisherman succumbed and perhaps even he died more from treatment than from radiation injury. Nonetheless, all were severely harmed.

There is an allegory here of tremendous significance. Are we not all, in a sense, fishermen in search of the elusive tuna? Are we not all buffeted by the sea of everyday living? Are we not all in danger of sudden death from the skies, from the "Shi No Hai"? Are we not all teetering on the brink of near-global nuclear war, with precious little any of us can do to alter our destiny?

At times, Lapp cries out against the injustice of circumstance. He blames secrecy and the "security" people who guard the secrets. It is true that the test officials, within hours after the blast,

The new Blanshard
The facts after ten years
American Freedom and Catholic Power, 1958
by PAUL BLANSHARD

The first edition of Blanshard's famous classic has stood like Gibraltar over the years against every criticism. In this new edition, he provides a Calendar of Significant Events, 1947-57; adds fresh analyses of new Supreme Court decisions; hundreds of new documentary sources. . . . The indispensable reference book. $3.95

27 *at your bookstore or write to*
BEACON PRESS DEPT. NR 3
25 BEACON ST., BOSTON, MASS.
Send me *postpaid:*
☐ AMERICAN FREEDOM AND CATHOLIC POWER 1958 $3.95
☐ Your new catalog
Name_____
Street_____
City_____ State_____
__Check__Money Order No C.O.D.'s

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

knew that fallout was heavy and was being carried in the wrong direction by capricious winds. Had the test officials been unfettered by secrecy regulations, they might have warned all the maritime services. This might have resulted in broadcasts which might have encouraged the Japanese fishermen to ask for advice and assistance. Their exposures might have been cut in half. Even more candid announcement of tests *in advance* might have prevented the accident entirely. There is a great irony in security regulations which, to keep the world "safe," must hide great dangers.

To my mind, however, secrecy is not the primary culprit. After all, are not the men who design the bombs, who explode the bombs, who keep the secrets, are not all these men just as enmeshed in circumstances beyond their control as were the Japanese fishermen? If it should prove that the story of the fishermen is an allegorical preview of the fate of mankind, let us hope that the final outcome is as happy as the end of the fishermen's story. Only one of them died, the others are building new lives, and in spite of an initial period of sterility, some have had children.

The moral of the fishermen's story is that war *must* be banned. But how many more "fishermen" will become dusted with "Shi No Hai" before men, in sufficient numbers to break the web of fate, are moved to action?

A Failure of Invention

by William Esty

IT'S A PITY about *I Like It Here;* Kingsley Amis' first novel, *Lucky Jim*, is a minor comic masterpiece and his second, *That Uncertain Feeling,* while less funny and more uneven, promised a succession of delightfully readable books marked by a distinctive mixture of painfully accurate social observation and exasperated wit. *I Like It Here* bears most of the distinguishing marks of a tree in the Amis forest, but there is no sap in this trunk.

I Like It Here, by Kingsley Amis (Harcourt, Brace; $3.75)

The Amis- hero is always a harassed, tetchy young man with an "intellectual" job that he loathes or at least feels oppressed in, a man of a thousand prejudices, especially against Culture, who is well aware of his own lazy lack of purposefulness, but who also is kind, decent, irritatedly honest, and with even sweaty-palmed courage and a cracked but never quite fragmented integrity. In *Lucky Jim* he was the Jim Dixon of the title, an instructor in a provincial university hilariously struggling with his witless department head and his own distaste for his subject, medieval English history. In *That Uncertain Feeling* he was John Lewis, a Welsh assistant librarian whose attempts to secure a promotion are complicated by an adulterous affair with the wife of the rich man who can obtain the promotion for him. For the purposes of *I Like It Here* he is Garnet Bowen, reviewer and BBC broadcaster, who gets sent to Portugal with his wife and children to do a travel article for an American magazine. Onto this reluctantly undertaken mission is superimposed a second chore, to sleuth out for a London book publisher whether a certain man living near Lisbon, the author of a recently received manuscript, is indeed who he claims to be, viz. the mysterious Wulfstan Strether, "great" novelist whose past works have been brought out by the firm. Implausibly enough, no one in the firm has ever met Strether, or knows anything about him; the task is to discover whether the expatriate writer is actually the famous Man of Letters or a clever impostor. Garnet Bowen duly takes his family to Portugal, which he decides is just about as he expected it to be—nice enough, but irremediably "abroad," so why go?—and in his desultory fashion solves the literary riddle for his publisher friend. That is all, and there's precious little fun along the way.

We have the compulsive apologies for the fact that Bowen occasionally listens to classical music, that he reads books (because he has to as a free-lance commentator, of course), that he has even caught himself in a "gross betrayal into non-ironical cultural discussion." How embarrassed he is to find himself not having such a bad time abroad, after all! There Bowen is, drinking wine with pleasure even though all "the awful craps" go on about it. "It was a pity that such terrible people said that colors were brighter in the South, because they were right." Visiting Fielding's tomb, admitting to himself that "Lisbon was all right," Bowen hastens to reassure himself that "he could keep quiet about it when he got home."

This latest Amis-hero works much too hard at keeping up the intellectual teddy-boy game, so funny and convincing in the first two novels. Dutifully, ineptly he keeps reminding us that he can't stand the theatre, or painting, or Henry James — naming the pompous "great" novelist after the main figure in *The Ambassadors* is a bit ham-handed. There *are* flashes of the old, cleverly dyspeptic Amis, in Strether's famous speeches (but is this a *great* novelist, even in quotation marks?), in Bowen's remarks on Britain the land of "Sorry sir," in such a passage as this, calculated to bring quiet delight to the heart of any ex-tourist in a Mediterranean country:

> All those revving motor-bikes, all those touts, all that staring—which in England would be the mindless inquisitiveness of those whose greyly uniform lives were nourished on mere sensation, but in the sunny South was a frank, free, healthy, open, uninhibited curiosity.

But even such softer echoes of the earlier unforced irritability are rare.

Even the traditional anti-heroic self-depreciation — "the bedraggled sprawl that was the core of his being"—seems gratuitous here, more a product of habit than anything integral to the book. Garnet Bowen resembles John Lewis in possessing a guilty adulterous eye, but Bowen's extra-marital hankerings lead to no more than a perfunctory, unamusing flirtation.

All Amis-heroes drink as much as they can afford, but for medievalist Jim Dixon, that last slug of Scotch just before the public lecture in Merrie England, the quality of which is to determine his academic future, results in a marvelous, drunken denunciation of the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Middle Ages and all its present-day boosters; when Garnet Bowen gets drunk at a Lisbon party, it is merely boring. Jim Dixon and John Lewis were oppressed by the Powers That Be in the university and library worlds, or at least felt themselves to be, and it was their struggles against the bonds of peonage to their snobbish and dull-witted superiors that lent their stories edge and point, "Garnet Bowen" is not really oppressed, though he works hard at feeling so: he has enough money, considerable success, and actually does pretty much as he pleases with his life. This makes Bowen's creator mightily uneasy, robbing himself and his readers alike of the old free-swinging fun.

Kingsley Amis needs a new "hero"-figure, or an unembarrassed grip on the old one. One hopes that his fictional motor is just temporarily stalled. *I Like It Here* is simply an exhibit of failure of invention, the lack of what Henry James (*pace*, Mr. Amis!) used to call *doing*.

ART

18th Century British Painting

AS MUCH as anyone, I dislike having to account for my background, but having recently been exposed as a Middle Western isolationist and therefore really pro-German, I now have the painful duty to confess that by birth, training, association and present conviction, I am an Eastern internationalist. It is bound to become clear in what follows that, like most Eastern internationalists, I am really pro-British.

Over at Toledo there is now showing, in its only United States appearance, an unparallelled exhibition of 18th Century British painting. Last fall Londoners got ten days of the show at the Tate. Since then it has been in Montreal, Ottowa and Toronto. It seems odd that the single US view of the exhibition should be offered in this undeniably Middle Western lake port rather than, say, Baltimore, the Athens of Maryland, but there's more behind it than geographical convenience. Work on the exhibition began ten years ago and it began with the Toledo director, Blake-More Godwin. Associated with Godwin as the project grew were the Canadian directors and most importantly the Fine Arts Committee of the British Council.

The need for all that leverage throws some light on the generally low repute of British painting of the period. The substantial majority of the pictures in the show are from private houses in England. Beginning with Queen Elizabeth many of the lenders are the descendants of the people who commissioned the paintings in the first place. The great British collections of European art that were formed in the same century have been filtering into the public domain for decades and on both sides of the Atlantic, forming the nucleus of many an American museum and proving beyond doubt that the grand tourists toured with taste. For understandable reasons, the reluctant sellers of great-grandfather's French and Italian pictures have kept the image of the old boy himself where it was first hung. The show at Toledo proves that 18th Century British painting is a great period in art and that it is probably unique in the high percentage of its masterpieces still in private hands.

The general image of British art as isolated and rather pokey was effectively demolished by the big show two years ago at the Museum of Modern Art dealing with the English since 1800. There was probably too much attention given the pre-Raphaelite brotherhood — it is hard to imagine the Museum doing a 19th Century French show with equivalent space given Bouguereau and his buddies. But Constable and Turner were fully recognized and their importance to the development of impressionism made clear.

The Toledo show demonstrates that those later painters were not so much rebelling against the 18th Century as carrying a bit further an approach already explicit in Gainsborough's landscapes. There are seven of them on view and they display that fidelity to the unposed terrain and that awareness of natural light and shadow that are found in Corot.

There is one compelling reference to what might be considered the "mainstream" of the century, the French. Whereas Watteau's courtesans are got up as shepherdesses, Francis Hayman presents a group of milkmaids splendidly arrayed in silks and satins for a May Day dance. The composition is classically symmetrical, pyramiding up to a dazzling group of pewter plates and vessels on the head of a bearer and there is beautiful handling of fabric and metal in light.

Portraits, of course, are the mainstream of the show. Reynolds proves over and over that you don't have to be Spanish to paint great portraits. The Duke of Wellington, in an introductory essay, is at some pains to correct the impression that the British, as a Protestant nation, have no religious art. His Grace's point is that many an English church had painted altar pieces which were removed in Victoria's reign. I think he might reasonably have said that the religious spirit in art, which vanished almost completely from French painting of the period, survived among the English in their portraits with the rich, the beautiful and the famous taking the place of virgins, martyrs and angels.

Perhaps this is most obvious in Benjamin West's well known "Death of Wolfe," with the over-all arrangement of the figures, their response to the situation and the attitude of the painter himself all adapted from a solid tradition of portraying the dead Christ at the foot of the cross.

But a more general religious spirit pervades the portraits and is at its finest in Sir Joshua. His Colonel Tarleton is a young god, buckling up for epic battle, as clouds of glory dramatize his stance and immortal horses strain toward the fighting. Reynolds' Ionna Leigh stands at her ease in a private park, inscribing

Notes on Contributors

RICHARD HOGGART, a prominent British sociologist, is the author of a new study of the spread of literacy in England. JOHN FANDEL is a novice at a Benedictine monastery. HANS ROGGER teaches at Sarah Lawrence. WILLIAM F. NEUMAN is a scientist and on the faculty of the University of Rochester. WILLIAM ESTY lives in New York and writes free-lance.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

her love's name on a tree. Her sandals and the thin veil over her stately voluptuousness both suggest the Olympian reference.

Hoppner, though less well known, brings his own interpretation of the personal apotheosis with success that now seems equal to Reynolds'. This religious spirit is present but weakens in Ramsay, Romney and Raeburn, with a final flowering in Lawrence, who often pushes it a shade too far.

Counter to all this, providing the other pole of the century's dialectic, is Hogarth, who reveals both the mechanics and the probable destination of the paths of glory. His sketch for a masked ball painting, "The Wanstead Assembly," is peopled with pudgy squires and lanky Ichabods whooping it up in the spirit of Washington Irving. Hogarth was a print man at heart and the Toledo Museum has thoughtfully added a print room to the show with the entire "Rake's Progress."

Toledo has also included a selection of its own modern British painters. Notable are a Piper landscape of rare strength—texture and light in a Welsh quarry—and a nice bric-a-Braque still life by Patrick Heron.

FRANK GETLEIN

Correspondence

(Continued from page 3)

must first learn a little something, but they expect instant understanding in art or rush to a critic interpreter.

It is not the critic who makes art history, it is the artist; but the artist refuses to talk, and this exasperates intellectuals. The artist does not talk because you are asking him to interpret his art in terms of another; and the critic, even a good one, like Mr. Getlein, has not only his strong personal bias but a belief (generic to critics) that criticism too is an art. That may be, but artists dislike being used as objects in another art. Moreover, Mr. Getlein sounds like a humanist which naturally makes for a freeze in *The New Republic* art climate because that term needs redefining for artists after the "humanist" conflict of a few years ago.

However kindly disposed your readers may feel, you do ask a great deal when you ask them to guide you out of your self-imposed tunnel by sending you an enlightening letter against the position your journal has taken during fifty-two issues. It is like asking an artist to tell you quickly exactly what is the difference between the utilitarian and the spiritual in art.

Abstract-expressionism already has its place in art history and will be remembered for truly having made progress for all the rest of us during the mid-20th century. "To give tangible form to that which is inward, to represent it in such a way that we see it as the outward image of inward things—that is a most rare power." (Jacob Burckhardt) Liberals who should be *with* new art, are—many of them—not really interested in art at all, for the simple reason that what's wrong with the times in general is also wrong with the world of art—lack of communication. It is not the artist's fault that most people have had inadequate are education. They know about art, but not the actual experience of it. When they say they hate abstract expressionism the implication is that they love Giorgione or Tintoretto, but ask them what they liked in the "Doge Alvise Mocenigo and Family before the Madonna and Child" at the Mellon and they may admit that actually they haven't been to the Mellon since the big Kress shindig in 1956.

Artists who break into new pictorial space trying to stretch the limits of art must have a courage that encompasses failure. The act itself is the reward. "The workman gets his hire as he goes." Abstract expressionism is concerned with process not ends because the ends are not known. Too, they consider the random as an art element. Is that so terrible? Contemporary physicists have become more thoughtful also about the role of chance in their calculations.

Justice Holmes quotes Malebranche who said that if God held in one hand truth and, in the other, the pursuit of truth, he (Malebranche) would say, "Lord, the truth is for thee alone, give me the pursuit." Should the liberal allow the lawyer what he denies the artist?

A sympathetic, instead of a demand-climate is a luxury in creative work. In the USSR, apparently, it is accorded to scientists. Dr. Edward Teller in his testimony before the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee said,

> The main point is that we do not know where we are going when we are doing the most interesting things, but there are a number of indications that we are going to find something . . . These things, at first, will seem impractical. Their practical consequences will occur later and the Russians have shown in many examples that they are quite willing to support this impractical science which is the breeding ground of the practical science, which in turn, is the foundation for the real technological advances. They took a broad program and they were not saving any effort, and that is the way they have beaten us. . . .

But not in art, because artists, like the so-called abstract-expressionists are the forerunners of a great Renaissance which is just barely beginning to be understood for what it is. Concerned with stretching human experience outwardly

$1600 CASH Awards plus 40% Royalty
All types of manuscripts invited.
Best Book Contest For 1958
For Contest rules and details of famous publishing plan, write for Brochure N.
Pageant Press, 101 Fifth Ave., N. Y. 8

IT'S JUST PLAIN COMMON SENSE
To invest for all purposes Funds, Plans in Bank Stock for:
- MORE PROFIT as Manufacturers Trust Co. earned $4.06 in '57 or 9 percent.
- FOR SAFETY! BANK SAFETY
- GROWTH! Banks are entering a new period of prosperity, importance and growth.
- FOR CERTAINTY: EARNS excellent profits in uncertain times as well as good periods. Shares available from 1 to 1,000 shares. More and better terms and services.

BUY FROM THE BANK SPECIALISTS:
MAXWELL MAY CO.
17 East 55th St., New York 22, N. Y.
It's Just Plain Common Sense to invest in BANK STOCKS FOR ALL purposes Funds, plans, institutions, etc.

"Evolution of an American Communist—Why I Quit after 27 years" by John Gates. 25 cents per copy. Send remittances to John Gates, 1236 Pacific Street, Brooklyn 16, New York.

OLD BOOKS FOUND. CATALOGS issued. Our specialty, Spanish books, but we try to stock good books on all subjects. El Cascajero, the old Spanish book mine, 164 Lexington, New York 16.

BRITISH BOOK BARGAINS—ALL SUBJECTS. Catalogues free. Transbooks, Box 1—NR, Wantagh, New York.

BRITISH SHOES FOR GENTLEMEN at a fraction of their American retail price! $10.95 includes duty and import charges. Delivery in days from receipt of order. Unconditional money back guarantee. Write for free illustrated catalogue. Steven Williams, Jr., Ltd., 40 Chester Road, Short Hills, New Jersey.

PRINTED BY NATIONAL PUBLISHING CO., 301 N ST., N. E., WASHINGTON 2, D. C.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The New Republic announces a competition for younger writers.

$1000 in awards

for

► The best essays on the state of American fiction—considered in general or in terms of a single younger novelist.

► The best essays on any aspect of present-day television — viewed as a medium for enlightenment or entertainment.

●

If you are under 27 you are eligible for this competition.

●

10 awards of $100 each
5 in each of the two categories

●

We are looking for writers who are already good but not yet famous.

Essays should be 1500-3000 words in length. Manuscripts will be judged by the editors of *The New Republic*. Return postage should be enclosed.

Submit manuscripts by October 1, 1958 to

Awards Department
The New Republic
1244 - 19th St., N.W.
Washington 6, D. C.

and inwardly, it has to do with a sense of wonder and a faith which the artist shares with men of religious beliefs, with research scientists and with everybody else who wonders what am I? what is the world? and what is my relation to it. This is why liberals should be the first to extend new art an understanding climate.

DOROTHY H. GOLDBERG
Washington, D. C.

". . . how dogmatic and reactionary"

AFTER READING Norman James' (*NR*, Mar. 10) doctrinaire letter indicting Frank Getlein on art I was pleased to see your editorial add a question mark. When will pseudoliberals see how dogmatic and reactionary they really are in substituting contemporary formulas or fads for constructive thought? It wouldn't be so irritating if we all didn't find ourselves lapsing occasionally. This self-same bias was evinced by Rose G. Levan (Mar. 3, *NR*) with her monolithic bloc of "Catholics" neatly dynamited by your footnote.

Could I pose a thesis that the true liberal does not pursue something because it is already contemporary, but because he wants to *make* it so. And he persists in the belief that this object, whether resurrected from antiquity or freshly conceived, is applicable in the present context.

OWEN L. MEYER
Washington, D. C.

► *Practical Politics*

SIRS:

I HAVE just read Ronnie Dugger's "Any Friend of Oil Is a Friend of Ours" (*NR*, Feb. 24). The tone of moral indignation is all very well, yet butters few parsnips. The important question must be, "What (if anything) can be done about it?" I doubt that any decently literate American can feel surprise when told that campaign contributions are not made out of purely disinterested patriotic concern.

We say we live under a democratic policy; but at the bottom our politics operates as an uneasy hybrid between democracy and plutocracy. The practical politician must face two ways: unless himself a multi-millionaire, he must find funds to finance his campaign, and to get money he must go where money is; on the other hand, he must say (and do) what will be acceptable, or anyhow can be made acceptable to the voters.

How then? Senator Neuberger suggests financing campaigns out of the taxes. With the present competition for tax money, the prospect is not encouraging. But it is possible that substantial improvement might be effected by the simpler device of obligatory voting. Belgium enforced it for a number of years before World War I—and maybe does so yet, or again; and Australia, I understand, has just very recently adopted it.

A brief study of the Belgian experience disclosed a remarkable consensus of those who had lived under it, that it had a healthy effect on Belgian politics. It avoided our politicians' frenetic anxiety to "get out the votes;" thereby it had largely abolished bally-hoo and band-wagon politics, and had made the voters more responsive to calm and thoughtful discussion of genuine public issues.

Obligatory voting would seem likely to bring similar results in this country. It may be commended to the consideration of those who, like Senator Neuberger and me, are anxious to see something done to lessen our politicians' need of hobnobbing with the fat cats.

G. W. C. ROSS
Minneapolis State College

The New Republic welcomes communications from its readers in regard to subjects of current interest. Those of 300 words or less lend themselves to publication more readily than longer letters.

THE THEATRE GUILD and DORE SCHARY present
RALPH BELLAMY
SUNRISE AT CAMPOBELLO
by DORE SCHARY
with MARY FICKETT · HENRY JONES
Directed by VINCENT J. DONEHUE
CORT THEA. 138 W. 48 St., N. Y. C.

EUROPE
Summer 1958—70 days
We'll see the usual, plus North Africa, Yugoslavia, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Berlin, and Denmark. A low priced, different kind of trip for the young in spirit who don't want to be herded around.
EUROPE SUMMER TOURS
255 Sequoia (Box N)
Pasadena, Calif.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED